In Q3 2024, 83% of production container outages traced to misconfigured isolation primitives—yet 68% of engineering teams still treat container runtimes as black boxes. Docker 28 and Podman 5.0, paired with Linux 6.10’s new namespace and seccomp extensions, change the isolation game entirely. Here’s what’s actually happening under the hood. Architectural Overview: Container Isolation Stack Figure 1: High-level isolation stack for Docker 28 and Podman 5.0 on Linux 6.10. The stack layers from bottom to top: Linux 6.10 kernel (namespaces, seccomp, cgroups v2, LSM), runtime userspace (Docker 28 daemon / Podman 5.0 CLI), OCI runtime (runc 1.2 / crun 1.14), container init process. Docker 28 uses a client-daemon architecture where the daemon holds privileged access to the kernel; source code available at moby/moby . Podman 5.0 uses a daemonless fork-exec model where each container is a child of the user’s shell, with no central privileged process; source code available at containers/podman .…