Silverfort found that Microsoft's new "Agent ID Administrator" role in Entra ID could take over literally any service principal in your tenant — 99% of orgs were exposed. Let's talk about what this means for AI agent identity security. So Microsoft just quietly patched something that I think deserves more attention in the enterprise security community. Silverfort's researchers (Noa Ariel and Yoav S.) discovered that the **Agent ID Administrator** role in Microsoft Entra ID — introduced specifically to manage AI agent identities — had a scope overreach flaw. Despite being documented as "scoped to agent-related objects only," the role could: • Assign ownership of *any* service principal in the tenant (not just agent-related ones) • Inject credentials onto that principal • Authenticate as that principal → inherit all its permissions If the targeted service principal had Global Admin or privileged Graph API permissions? Full tenant compromise from a role that looks like a low-privilege bot management assignment.…